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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LEWIS RICKY YATES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950444-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Lewis Ricky Yates appeals the sentence imposed for
his conviction for theft, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1995) (R. 81). This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp.
1995) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Where the State continued to contend the property

defendant stole had a higher value than that to which defendant
admitted to support his plea, should the Court allow defendant to
rely on his property value admission to obtain a sentence even
lower than that for which the parties bargained?
2.

Should the appellate courts limit the rule that a
1

defendant is entitled to the benefit of a pre-sentencing
statutory amendment that lowers the applicable penalty to exclude
situations where, as here, the defendant delays the sentencing
until after the effective date of the amendment by his
unjustified absences from prior sentencing hearings?
Because both issues involve the interpretation of or a
change in precedent, the present questions of law reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ANP RULES
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with theft, a third degree
felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412
(1995) (R. 5-6). Defendant agreed to plead guilty to class A
misdemeanor theft and pleaded guilty to that crime on January 13,
1995 (R. 5, 17, 25-26, 111-12).

By order dated June 28, 1995,

the trial court sentenced defendant to a one-year prison term,
imposed a $1,000 fine, and ordered defendant to pay restitution
(R. 81). Defendant filed his notice of appeal on July 11, 1995
(R. 91) .

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
When defendant broke-up with Raylynn Coumier and moved out,
he took her property without permission (R. 6). The State
contended the stolen property had a value of $1,234 (R. Ill), and
Ms. Coumier's insurance company valued the stolen property at
$1,150 (R. 137).x
The State agreed to accept defendant's guilty plea to class
A misdemeanor theft rather than try him for the charged third
degree felony theft (R. 20). Defendant admitted that the
property he stole had a value between $100 and $250, the amount
then necessary to support a conviction a class A misdemeanor
theft conviction (R. 18). Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (c)
(1995) .
After accepting the plea, the trial court ordered a
presentence investigation report and scheduled sentencing for
February 17, 1995 (R. 25-26).

By letter filed February 13, 1995,

the Department of Corrections informed the trial court that
defendant missed his appointment for his presentence
investigation interview (R. 32). Defendant subsequently failed
to appear at the February sentencing hearing, and the trial court

x

The insurance company paid Ms. Coumier $900, but did not
pay the $250 deductible (R. 137).
3

issued a bench warrant (R. 33-34).
After securing defendant's attendance on March 13, 1995, the
trial court continued sentencing to April 14, 1995 in order to
obtain a presentence report (R. 44). By letter filed April 11,
1995, the Department of Corrections informed the trial court that
defendant had again missed his presentence investigation
interview (R. 46). In support of a motion to withdraw as
counsel, defendant's retained counsel stated that defendant had
not contacted him since bailing out of jail, and that counsel had
made approximately forty telephone calls to defendant's friends,
relatives, and bail bondsman in unsuccessful attempts to locate
defendant (R. 47). Defendant also failed to appear at the April
14, 1995 sentencing and the trial court issued another bench
warrant for defendant's arrest (R. 48-49).
On May 1, 1995, legislature's amendments to the theft
statutes took effect.
1995).

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp.

Those amendments changed the relevant theft

classifications as follows: 1) third degree felony theft now
requires a $1,000 to $5,000 property value; 2) class A
misdemeanor theft now requires a $300 to $1,000 property value;
and 3) any property value under $300 is a class B misdemeanor.

4

Defendant was arrested on May 22, 1995 on the April 1995
bench warrant (R. 52). On June 2, 1995, the trial court
scheduled sentencing for June 28, 1995 to allow time for a
presentence report and denied defendant's motion for bail (R.
55).

The trial court imposed the punishment prescribed for a

class A misdemeanor (R. 81). 2 At sentencing, defendant asserted
that Utah law required the trial court to sentence him to class B
misdemeanor theft under the amended classifications (R. 132-34).
The trial court refused, noting that: 1) defendant voluntarily
pleaded to a class A misdemeanor; and 2) defendant's repeated
failures to appear caused the delay in sentencing beyond the
effective date of the theft classification amendments (R. 14041) .
The argument sections contain further relevant facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1.

Defendant is not entitled to be resentenced to a class

B misdemeanor.

Defendant grounds his argument on his admission

during his change of plea that he stole property with a value of
between $100 and $250: the amount necessary at the time he

2

The trial court also imposed restitution of the $250
deductible on Ms. Coumier's insurance (R. 141). The trial court
refused to order restitution to the insurance company for the
$900 it paid on Ms. Coumier's claim (id.).
5

pleaded to support his guilty plea to class A misdemeanor theft.
Defendant claims that, because the legislature amended the
classifications after his plea, but prior to his sentencing to
require proof of a property value between $300 and $1,000 to
support a class A misdemeanor sentence for theft, the trial court
should have sentenced him to a class B misdemeanor.

However, the

State bargained for defendant's plea to a crime punishable as a
class A misdemeanor, and defendant only admitted to the facts
necessary to consummate that bargain.

Resentencing defendant to

a class B misdemeanor would deprive the State of the benefit of
its bargain.
Moreover, defendant relies on cases that require trial
courts to sentence defendants under the law in effect at the time
of sentencing if the legislature has reduced the penalty for the
charged crime.

However, those cases do not require the result

defendant seeks in this case.

In those cases, the undisputed or

established facts permitted imposing only the amended, reduced
penalty.

In this case, the State contended throughout the plea

and sentencing process that defendant stole property worth over
$1,000.

Because the parties neither established nor stipulated

to a property value supporting only a class B misdemeanor theft
sentence, the cases on which defendant relies do not require
6

resentencing him to a class B misdemeanor.
2.

If the Court finds that the cases on which defendant

relies do control this case, then the State contends that the
rule requiring trial courts to sentence a defendant to an
amended, lower penalty should be limited to exclude defendants
who have delayed their sentencings beyond the effective date of
the amended statutes. Admittedly, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that the rule applies even when the defendant delays the
sentencing by absenting himself from prior sentencings. However,
the majority opinion in that case, failed to consider the
potential the rule creates for manipulating the system.
Moreover, in the last twenty years since deciding that case, the
supreme court has not reconsidered whether to apply the rule in
cases similar to this one.

Sound policy requires limiting the

rule to prevent defendants from obtaining more favorable
sentences by flouting trial courts' orders to appear for
sentencing.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ORDER THE TRIAL COURT TO
RESENTENCE DEFENDANT TO A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR BECAUSE
IT WOULD GIVE DEFENDANT A BENEFIT BEYOND THAT FOR WHICH
HE BARGAINED, AND BECAUSE IT IS NOT REQUIRED BY THE
CASES ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIES
This Court should affirm defendant's sentence for a class A
misdemeanor theft because it gives to each party that for which
it bargained in the plea agreement.

Defendant claims that this

Court should order the trial court to sentence him to a class B
misdemeanor because: 1) he admitted to a property value of
between $100 and $250 when he pleaded guilty to class A
misdemeanor theft; 2) the trial court did not sentence him until
after the new theft classifications took effect; and 3) a class A
misdemeanor under the amended classifications requires proof of a
property value between $300 and $1,000, and any value under $300
only supports a class B misdemeanor theft sentence.
While the precedent on which defendant relies appears to
support his argument, that precedent should not apply under the
circumstances of this case.

Defendant's argument unjustifiably

promotes the importance of the facts to which defendant admitted
over the benefit each party sought from the plea bargain.

The

State agreed to forego prosecuting defendant for third degree
8

felony theft in exchange for his guilty plea to class A
misdemeanor theft (R. 20). The State bargained for and obtained
defendant's admission to a crime punishable as a class A
misdemeanor.

To complete the bargain, defendant admitted to the

facts necessary to support a guilty plea to class A misdemeanor
theft, including an admission that he stole property valued in
the range then necessary to support a class A misdemeanor
sentence (R. 18, 116) . However, as discussed below, the parties
never established or stipulated to the property's actual value;
that actual value was incidental to the bargain they had struck.
Because the existing one-year sentence gives to each party that
for which it bargained, and because ordering a lower class B
misdemeanor sentence would give defendant a windfall achieved
only by his flouting the trial court's orders to appear, this
Court should affirm defendant's sentence for a class A
misdemeanor.

Cf. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-76 (Utah

1988) (vacating a plea because the State's agreement had no real
value for the defendant).
Furthermore, the precedent on which defendant relies does
not require the result he seeks under the facts of this case.
Relying entirely on his admission that the property he stole had
a value between $100 and $250, defendant seeks the benefit of the
9

principle that a trial court must sentence a defendant to the
penalty in effect at the time of sentencing if the legislature
has lowered the penalty for his crime prior to sentencing.
Defendant contends that the facts to which he admitted supports
at most a class B misdemeanor sentence, and that this Court
should therefore order resentencing accordingly.

While Utah

precedent generally gives defendants the benefit of this rule, it
should not control this case.
In adopting the rule on which defendant relies, the Utah
Supreme Court recognized the legislature's prerogative to
establish the level of punishment for any given set of facts
constituting a crime and consequently restricted the trial courts
to imposing the penalty prescribed at the time the trial court
sentenced a defendant.

State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 335-36 (Utah

1971); Belt v. Turner. 479 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1971).

Applying

the rule in the cases establishing it served the policy adopted
by the court because the established or undisputed facts
permitted imposing only the lower penalty established by the
amended legislation.3

3

In
State v.
disputes
crimes.

State v. Saxton. 519 P.2d 1340, 1340-41 (Utah 1974) and
Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 335 (Utah 1971), juries resolved any
in the facts supporting the elements of the charged
In Belt v. Turner. 479 P.2d 791, 792 (Utah 1971), Belt
10

That is not the case here.

The parties agreed that

defendant would plead to a specific penalty classification, then
defendant admitted to facts sufficient to support that
classification.

Specifically, defendant admitted that the

property he stole had a value between $100 and $250 (R. 116), the
range of values necessary to support his plea to class A
misdemeanor theft at the time he made it, but $50 less than the
amount necessary to support the same plea under the amended
classifications.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(c) (1995) and

(Supp. 1995).
However, the parties did not stipulate to nor prove the
actual value of the property stolen, and the trial court did not
make any finding as to its actual value.

To the contrary, the

parties continued to dispute the property's actual value. At the
change of plea hearing, the State pointed out that defendant had
agreed to pay the full restitution, which the State contended
amounted to $1,234 (R. 111). At the sentencing hearing, the
State proffered that Ms. Coumier's insurance company had valued

pleaded guilty to issuing a fraudulent $10 check without
sufficient funds (a charge that depended upon the amount of the
check to determine the punishment), and nothing in the opinion
suggests any dispute existed as to the amount for which Belt
wrote the check.
11

the property at $1,150 (R. 137). Either amount is sufficient to
support the originally-charged third degree felony theft even
under the amendments.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995).

Defendant offered no alternative value; rather, he simply agreed
that he stole the property, and that it had at least the value
sufficient to support the theft classification to which he agreed
to plea (R. 116). Indeed, that defendant admitted to the then
applicable range, rather than a specific dollar amount, supports
concluding that he did not necessarily dispute that the property
had sufficient value to support a the originally-charged third
degree felony, but merely admitted to no more than the amount
necessary to support his guilty plea to a class A misdemeanor.
Because the parties did not establish or stipulate to facts
supporting only a class B misdemeanor, the cases on which
defendant relies do not require resentencing him to a further
penalty reduction.
In short, the trial court should affirm the trial court's
class A misdemeanor sentence because it gives to both parties the
benefit of their plea bargain, and because the rule on which
defendant relies does not require the outcome he seeks.
Alternatively, if this Court determines it cannot affirm the
sentence, the argument above still precludes resentencing him to
12

a class B misdemeanor.

At most, the Court should vacate the plea

and allow the parties either to establish the property's value or
to renegotiate defendant's plea.

The Court should not allow

defendant to use his dilatoriness to obtain a windfall in the
plea bargaining process.
POINT 11
ALTERNATIVELY, EXISTING UTAH CASE LAW SHOULD BE
MODIFIED TO PRECLUDE A DEFENDANT FROM OBTAINING THE
BENEFIT OF A LOWER SENTENCE WHERE HIS OWN CONDUCT
DELAYS SENTENCING BEYOND THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
AMENDMENTS LOWERING THE PENALTY
If the Court disagrees with the State's argument that the
rule on which defendant relies does not apply to this case, then
the State argues alternatively that the rule should be limited to
exclude situations, such as this, where the delay in sentencing
beyond the effective date of the reduced penalty results from
defendant's failure to appear for prior sentencing hearings. The
State recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has given defendants
the benefit of a lower penalty even where their own conduct
delayed the sentencing beyond the effective date of the statutory
amendments lowering the penalty.
(Utah 1974).

State v. Saxton. 519 P.2d 134 0

That precedent binds this Court.

State v. Menzies.

889 P.2d 393, n.3 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 910
(1995).

Therefore, if this Court reaches this argument, the
13

State requests that it certify the question to the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to rule 43, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Whatever policy reasons support giving the benefit of the
amended, lower penalty to a defendant who does nothing to delay
the sentence, giving that same benefit to a defendant who does
delay his sentencing promotes countervailing bad policy: it
allows a defendant, such as this defendant, to manipulate the
system and defy court orders to appear for sentencing, then
receive a reduced sentence as a reward.4

The law should not

create an opportunity for such manipulation.
The majority opinions in Belt. Tapp. and Saxton do not
discuss the potential for such manipulation.

Moreover, the

supreme court decided Saxton. the most recent opinion
establishing the rule, over twenty years ago and has not since
applied it in a situation, such as the one in this case, where

4

Defendant contends that the record contains no proof of why
he did not appear for the sentencing hearings he missed,
suggesting that he may have had a good reason for his absences.
While the record contains no direct proof of why he failed to
appear, it inferentially suggests that something more than bad
luck caused his absences. Defendant failed to appear at the
first preliminary hearing, two sentencing hearings, and two
presentence interviews (R. 32-33, 46, 125-26, 135-37, 140-41) .
He also failed to maintain contact with his retained attorney or
his bail bondsman (R. 47). The record contains no evidence that
he had a reasonable excuse for his chronic absences, and he
offered none at the June 1994 sentencing.
14

the defendant sought the benefit of this rule after absenting
himself until the more favorable penalty scheme took effect. Cf.
State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 572-73 (Utah) (1991) (dictum)
(rejecting the common law rule of resisting an unlawful arrest
because the conditions justifying the rule no longer existed).
To prevent manipulating the system to obtain a more favorable
sentence, the State asks that the appellate courts now limit the
rule to exclude situations where a defendant delays sentencing
beyond the effective date of the amendments by failing to appear
for prior sentencing hearings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, the State asks the Court to
affirm defendant's sentence. Alternatively, the State asks that
the Court, at most, vacate defendant's plea rather than order the
trial court to resentence him to a class B misdemeanor.

15

Qral Argument Requested
Because the State has asked this Court to distinguish prior
precedent, it requests oral argument to answer any questions or
concerns the Court may have about the approach the State asks it
to take.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Z

day of ^ 4 x » ,

m^
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed by first-class mail,
postage pre-paid, to the following on this 2™ day of

11% :
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Salt Lake Legal Defenders
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
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ADDENDUM A

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

76-6-404

court properly refused to give an instruction
proffered by defendant. State v. Larsen, 876
P.2d 391 (Utah C t App. 1994).

theft was committed in any manner specified in
§§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 745
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Pleading and practice.
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of
theft" required to be pled by this section to
invoke the provisions of consolidated theft
Once the prosecution charges a defendant with
the general offense of "theft" under § 76-6-404,
it may then present its evidence to prove the

Receiving stolen property.
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft without the necessity
of establishing theft by taking. State v. Taylor,
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404.
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-

rial anti-theft laws, § 41-la-1308 et seq.
Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Corpus delicti.
In prosecution for larceny it was not essential
that corpus delicti be established by evidence
independent of that adduced to prove that defendant was perpetrator of crime; the same
evidence could be used to prove both. State v.
Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev*d
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494
(1944).
Corpus delicti for offense of theft consists of
the elements that one entitled to possession of
the property has been deprived of possession
and such deprivation has been accomplished by
a felonious taking; evidence of the property
having been taken from the possession of the
owner without his knowledge or consent is
evidence of both of the elements of the corpus
delicti. SUte v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah
1980).

ANALYSIS

Bailments.
Comment on defendant's silence.
Corpus delicti.
Elements of offense.
Evidence.
—Weight and sufficiency.
Included offenses.
—Possession.
Instructions.
Intent.
Pleading and practice.
Possession of recently stolen property.
"Purpose to deprive."
Separate offenses.
Unauthorized control.
Venue.
Cited.
Bailments.
Bailor could be guilty of stealing his own
property, if done with intent to charge bailee.
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626
(1943).
Comment on defendant's silence.
Where defendant charged with theft of building materials from construction site did not
testify in his own defense and offered no evidence to explain his late-night presence at the
site, prosecutor's comment that: T h e defense
has presented no evidence as to why defendant
was out there. What was he doing out there?"
was a legitimate comment on what the total
evidence did or did not show; it was not impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975).

Elements of offense.
State is not required to prove conclusively
who the real owner of the property is, but only
that defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of another. State
v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977).
This section requires a finding of only one of
two disjunctives, "obtained" or "exercised unauthorized control" over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof; conviction for theft can be upheld without a finding
that defendant "obtained" the property, so long
as there is a finding that he "exercised unauthorized control" over it. State v. Walker, 649
P.2d 16 (Utah 1982).
Evidence.
Proof of identity of stolen goods could be by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. State

197

76-6-411

CRIMINAL CODE

demands by owner, court, sitting without a jury,
was not required to believe defendant's testimony that he gave typewriter to his business
partners to return, since partners were not
called to corroborate his story, and defendant
conveniently forgot important details. State v.
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 R2d 780 (1966).
Evidence supported conviction of embezzlement, where defendant had been given permission to continue to use car on somewhat openended contract after initial rental period had
expired, but defendant foiled to return car on
specific date on which he was finally told that
he must return it. State v. Heemer, 26 Utah 2d
309, 489 P.2d 107 (1971).
"Gross deviation."
As used in this section, the term "gross de-

viation" has the common sense meaning of
being an extreme deviation. State v. Owens,
638 P. 2d 1182 (Utah 1981).
Use related to purpose of agreement.
Subsection (1) assumes that the property
n^y be used by the custodian for purposes
properly related to the purpose of the entrustment; only a use that constitutes "a gross
deviation from the agreed purpose," without
e x p r e M consent for personal use, is a crime,
S t a t e v jfo^
6 1 0 R2d 1275 (Utah 1980).
Cited in State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny } 89.
CJB. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 46,47.

Key Numbers. — Larceny «=» 15.

76-6-411. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 76-6-411, as enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, { 76-6-411, relating to theft by
failure to make required payment or disposi-

tion of property subject to legal obligation, was
repealed by Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 41.

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been uyured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
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History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, § 18;
1975, ch. 48, S 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch.
78, § 1.

76-6-412

Cross-References. — Bus Passenger Safety
Act, theft of baggage or cargo, 5 76-10-1508.
Civil liability for treble damages for theft of
livestock, § 4-24-27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Construction.
Determining degree of crime.
Evidence.
Instructions.
Lesser included offenses.
Livestock.
Prior convictions.
Single offense based on separate takings.
Valuation of stolen property.
—Testimony of owner.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section, by making theft of certain livestock a third degree felony, irrespective of the
value of the livestock, does not deny equal
protection of the laws and does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against private or
special laws. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah
1981).
Construction.
This section does not outline the elements of
the crime of theft; it simply categorizes theft for
sentencing purposes into various degrees of
felonies and misdemeanors. Thus defendant
was improperly charged under § 76-6-404 and
this section with two separate counts of second
degree theft for stealing both a firearm and
property worth over $1000 in a single burglary;
the crime was instead one theft offense under
§ 76-6-404 punishable as a second degree felony under this section. State v. Casias, 772 P.2d
975 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
No claim for treble damages based on § 766-408(2Xd) and this section against businesses
that regularly deal in large bulk orders of raw
industrial material. See Alta Indus. Ltd. v.
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993).
Determining degree of crime.
In theft by deception, degree of the crime is
determined by the value of the property obtained by defendant as a result of the deception
without reducing that amount by any value
received by the victim. State v. Forshee, 588
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978).
Defendant's second degree felony conviction,
based on a check written for exactly $1,000,
was plain error, since he could only have been
convicted of a third degree felony on the basis of
the $1,000 check. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260
(Utah 1985).

Evidence.
State's use of color photographs of the stolen
property for evidence rather than producing
the actual tangible stolen property did not deny
defendant due process of law. State v.
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982).
Instructions.
It was reversible error to omit to instruct as
to amount of debt owing by defendant on auto,
left for repairs, but taken and driven away
without satisfying lien existing on car, if jury
had found that debt was less than $50, conviction for grand larceny would have been error.
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626
(1943).
Lesser included offenses.
The crime of carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon is a lesser included offense of seconddegree felony retail theft when the retail theft
is made a felony by the actor's being armed
with a deadly weapon in the course of the
crime. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Livestock.
Theft of dead calf was grand larceny, even
though value of meat did not exceed $50, where
animal was killed by thief as means of making
theft possible. State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402,131
P.2d 805 (1942).
Prior convictions.
A judgment of prior conviction must be written, clear and definite, and signed by the court
(or the clerk in a jury case) in order to serve as
the basis for enhancing a penalty under this
section. State v. Anderson, 797 P. 2d 1114 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Single offense based on separate takings.
Where defendant was employed to solicit
advertising contracts and within short time
had collected from different persons $235 due
publishing company upon contracts solicited
and procured by him, and where he had unlawfully converted money to his own use, taking of
$235 was one embezzlement and constituted
grand larceny, even though $48 was largest
amount collected from any one individual.
State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330,108 P. 349 (1910).
The value of the property stolen in separate
transactions can be added together to determine the degree of the crime if the separate
transactions are part of one continuing plan
and thus constitute a single offense. State v.
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(iv) is or exceeds $5,000 or if the offender has previously been
convicted of a violation of this section, the offense is a second degree
felony,
(b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are
prescribed in Section 76-6-412.
(5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or
cable television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or
cable television service consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this section.
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs for investigation,
disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and equipment use.
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a
utility or cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for
damages suffered as a result of the commission of any of the acts prohibited by
this section.
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy
otherwise available to a utility or cable television company.
History: C. 1953,1 76-6-409.3, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 88, § 3; 1989, eh. 30,1 S; 1990,
eh. 130,1 1; 1995, ch. 291,1 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "any

prohibited acts*for"any of the following acta" in
Subsection (2), rewrote Subsection (4Xa),
changing the value ranges and the degrees of
offenses, and made a minor stylistic change,

76-6-409.6. Use of telecommunication device to avoid lawful charge for service — Penalty.
(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with the intent to
avoid the payment of any lawful charge for telecommunication service or with
the knowledge that it was to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for
telecommunication service is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service
is less than $300 or cannot be ascertained;
(b) a class A misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service
charge is or exceeds $300 but is not more than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service is
or exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000; or
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service
is or exceeds $5,000.
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an offense under this
section shall be guilty of a second degree felony upon a second conviction and
any subsequent conviction.
History: C. 1953,76-6-409.6, enacted by L. than $300 or" in Subsection (lXa) and changed
1994, ch. 215, < 3; 1995, ch. 291, i 13.
the value ranges in Subsections (lXb) through
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- (d).
ment, effective May 1, 1995, inserted "is less

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
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(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is afirearmor an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolenfromthe person of another,
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less
than $5,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less
than $300.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
History: C. 1958, 76-6-412, enacted by L.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend1978, ch* 196, t 76-6-412; 1974, ch* 82,1 18; ment, effective May 1, 1995, increaaed the
1976, ch* 48, t 1; 1977, ch. 89,1 1; 1989, ch* value amount* in Subsections UXaXi), dXbXi),
78,1 1; 1995, ch- 891,1 14.
(1XO, and dXd).

PARTS
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating afraudto be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion*
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing* includes:
(a) printing or any other method of recording information, checks,
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any
other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) printing or writing a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government or any agency; or
(c) printing or writing a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim against
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or
enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
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(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those eases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3) (b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C 195Sf 76*2*2, enacted by L.
19S6, en- 47, | 41; 1987, eh. 161,1 80S; 1988,
ch. S48,1 5; 1989, eh. *7,1 1; 1992, eh-127,
I 11; 1994, eh, 191, I 2; 1995, eh. 2S7,1 5;
1995, eh. 199,1 46.
Amendment Note*. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,1992, in Subjection (4),
deleted former Subsections (e) and (f), which
read: "general water adjudication' and "taxation and revenue; and," respectively, making
related changes; redesignated former Subsec-

tion (g) as Subsection (a); and made stylistic
changes in Subsection (e).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
added Subsections (SXk) and (4Xe), making
related changes.
Ihe 1995 amendments by eh. 267 and ch.
299, both affective May 1,1995, made the same
changes: they changed 'Board of State Lands
and Forestry" to 'School and Institutional Trust
Lands Board of Trustees" in Subsection
(SXeXiii) and added Subsection (SXeXvi).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appellate Jurisdiction.
—Attachment.
—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Certiorari.
Original jurisdiction.
—Extraordinary write.
Cited.

Certiorari
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction
granted by this eection, the Supreme Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Dot of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the
parties should address the decision of the Court
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97 (Utah 1992).

Appellate juriediction.

Original jurisdiction-

—Attachment
Although this eection did not govern a land
conveyance because it was not in affect when
petitioner filed its writ of review, this eection
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, because jurisdiction attached under the
statute in effect when the petition for review
was filed. Nations] Parks & Conservation ASB'D
v. Board of Sute Lands, S69 P.2d 909 (Utah
1993).

—Extraordinary write.
The term "original" in Subsection (2) adds
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — and its absence in I 76-2a«3(l) takes
nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals — because jurisdiction over petitions
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition originally filed with it as opposed to its appellate
jurisdiction over eases thst originated elsewhere. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah
CtApp.1994).

ANALYSIS

—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Subdivision (3XeXiii) confers jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court only over final orders and
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of Sute Lands k
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992).

Cited in Sute v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464
(Utah 1991).

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
7S»2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

78-2a-S. Court of Appeals jurisdiction*
(1) The Court ofAppeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
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(a) to cany into affect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appealsfromthe district court review of
informal acftudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutions}
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appealsfromthe district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions d
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appealsfromthe juvenile courts;
(d) appealsfromthe circuit courts, except thosefromthe small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of afirstdegree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appealsfromorders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in case*
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, is
eluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, chil(
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appealsfromthe Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appeUatf
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals haJ
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1958, 7*2*4, emoted by L.
19*6, eh. 47,1 46; 1987, eh. 161,1 804; 1988,
eh. 7a, I Is m s , eh. tlO, I 141; 1*SS, eh.
24S, I S; 1990, eh. SO, I a,* 1990, eh. 224,1 8;
1991, eh. aSS, I 22; 1992, eh. 127,1 12; 1994,
eh. 18, | 46; 1995, eh. 299,1 47.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subjection (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsection!
<2Xh) through (J) si Subjections (2Xi) through
00.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,

substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole* fa
'Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xb) sal
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act* sj
Subsection (4).
1
Ihe 1995 amendment, effective May 1,199u
substituted "School and Institutional TruiJ
Lands Board of Trustee!, Division of Severed
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by wk
executive director of the Department of Natunj
Resources* for "Board of State Lands* in BcA
section (2Xs).

